



# British Defence Doctrine

# JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 0-01

## BRITISH DEFENCE DOCTRINE

(SECOND EDITION)

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## PREFACE

British Defence Doctrine (BDD) sits at the pinnacle of the UK's hierarchy of joint doctrine publications. Although it is focused primarily on the doctrinal component of the UK's military strategy, it conveys a message about the tone and nature of the British approach to military activity at all levels. That approach must be flexible and pragmatic, attributes that are essential for the effective application of the manoeuvrist approach to operations. Doctrine is not, therefore, mandatory dogma to be applied in all circumstances; that is simply not the British Armed Forces' way of doing business. It is the distilled experience of many years – indeed, generations – of making strategy and of mounting and conducting military operations. Most (although by no means all) of those operations have gone well and the UK has a reputation for strategic success, with Armed Forces that are highly regarded around the world.

It is the British Armed Forces' inherent warfighting skills and potential that must remain the key to their credibility and effectiveness. By preparing for war and developing to the full all three components of fighting power – Conceptual, Moral and Physical - the Armed Forces will retain the physical and mental ability and agility to apply themselves to a wide range of challenges. Sound leadership at all levels, administrative and management skills honed for application in crisis, and high levels of motivation, will turn well disciplined, intelligent and capable men and women, into an effective and flexible instrument of policy.

Fighting power can be applied benignly. However, it is an especially powerful and influential instrument of policy when it is used to deter or coerce during a measured process of conflict prevention and confrontation management. This includes the conduct of peace support operations, low intensity law enforcement and other operations aimed at securing humanitarian benefit. While many of these operations will be benign in nature, the effective management of confrontation will often depend on the ability to apply lethal force in a measured and deliberate fashion when necessary. At the very core of this ability is an attitude that is both flexible and endowed with humanity. The combination of war-fighting skills and humanity may seem paradoxical. However, a vitally important part of motivation is the belief in what one is doing: the measured application of force requires discipline and a finely tuned sense of moral purpose. The British approach to the development of fighting power has this vital quality at its core.

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# BRITISH DEFENCE DOCTRINE

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## **JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATIONS**

The successful prosecution of joint operations requires a clearly understood doctrine that is acceptable to all nations and Services concerned. It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine). Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered, or at all, by NATO doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the development of a hierarchy of Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

As a general rule, JWPs of principal interest to Joint Force Commanders/National Contingent Commanders and their staffs are situated 'above the line' in the hierarchy; while more detailed operational and tactical doctrine including Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTPs) are positioned below.

Joint Doctrine Pamphlets (JDPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a foreshortened timescale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur when a more comprehensive 'parent' publication is under development, but normally well in advance of its planned publication.

The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JWPs is explained in Joint Service DCIs.

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# **PART I**

# **INTRODUCTION**

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# CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCING MILITARY DOCTRINE

## THE PURPOSE OF DOCTRINE

Military doctrine is defined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as *'fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application.'*<sup>1</sup> The principal purpose of military doctrine, therefore, is to provide the Armed Forces with a framework of guidance for the conduct of operations. It is about how those operations should be directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained and recovered. It is not, therefore, about the past nor is it about the medium or longer term future. It is about today and the immediate future. It is dynamic and is constantly reviewed for relevance. It describes how the Armed Forces go about military activities but not about why they do what they do (which is the realm of policy and which is discussed in more detail in the final section of this chapter).

Military doctrine is targeted principally at members of the Armed Forces. British Defence Doctrine (BDD), as the UK's military strategic level doctrine, discusses issues of particular and direct relevance to military officers of mid-seniority and above filling senior staff appointments, including in the Ministry of Defence. However, by its nature, it represents a statement of the British approach to military operations that will serve to educate those military officers in the early stages of their professional training and development. It also serves to inform others who have a need to understand how the UK conducts military activities. This clearly includes Ministers and their immediate staffs, as well as other officials of the Ministry of Defence and other Government departments involved in activities impinging on Defence Policy. Key Government departments in this respect include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DfID), the Home Office, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Treasury.

BDD has a wider secondary purpose. Members of Parliament, academics, industrialists, journalists and members of the general public, all of whom have a legitimate interest in the way the UK's Armed Forces go about their business, will find BDD of interest. Some, like those in the Defence related industrial and commercial sector, will find an understanding of the British approach to military operations a vital backdrop to their business. Doctrine is of value to allies and potential coalition partners who will benefit from an understanding of the UK's military ethos and general approach to strategic and military issues. It also conveys a message to potential opponents and adversaries that the UK is militarily well prepared; by doing this BDD contributes to deterrence in the broadest sense. Importantly, while secondary purposes are useful, doctrine has to be written around the principal purpose

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<sup>1</sup> AAP-6

of conducting effective military operations. Indeed, it is the fact that it is written for that principal purpose that endows it with utility in other respects.

## **THE LEVELS OF WAR**

Military activities are conducted at different levels involving different people, from the senior political leadership of the state to the soldiers, sailors and airmen at the forefront of military operations. Traditionally, military activities were viewed as having either strategic or tactical qualities. Some eminent scholars discerned a level between those two – what Jomini referred to as grand tactics – and, especially after the Second World War, a higher political or grand strategic level has frequently been referred to. Within NATO there are four levels currently accepted as providing a framework for command and analysis: the grand strategic, the military strategic, the operational and the tactical. The British interpretation of these levels can be summarised as follows.

### **The Grand Strategic Level**

Grand strategy is to do with the full range of issues associated with the maintenance of political independence and territorial integrity and the pursuit of wider national interests. It is about the co-ordinated use of the three principal instruments of national power: economic, diplomatic and military. It is as much concerned with the avoidance of war as with its conduct. Grand strategy is the collective responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

### **The Military Strategic Level**

Military strategy is the military component of grand strategy. It is the art of developing and employing military forces consistent with grand strategic objectives. Military strategy is developed by the Chiefs of Staff supported by their officials (both military and Civil Service) under the direction of the Secretary of State for Defence.

### **The Operational Level**

The operational level is the level of war at which campaigns are planned. Operational art - the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of campaigns or major operations - links military strategy to tactics. It does this by establishing operational objectives, initiating actions and applying resources to ensure the success of the campaign. These activities are the responsibility of the Joint Commander, and of the Joint Task Force Commander once deployed to the Joint Operations Area where the campaign takes place.

## The Tactical Level

This is the level at which warfighting actually takes place. Tactics is the art of disposing maritime, land, air and special forces for battle, and logistics for direct support of those engaged in combat to achieve success in battle. In a joint operation, the highest tactical commanders are the Component Commanders working directly to the Joint Task Force Commander. Below them are the formation and unit commanders and other subordinate commanders whose task it is to engage in direct combat with the enemy.

## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LEVELS OF WAR

The levels of war provide a general framework for the command and control of operations and a useful tool for the analysis of politico-military activity, before, during and after the conduct of military operations. An understanding of them - and of their limitations - is vital to a commander's grasp of the conduct of war.

The levels of war provide a means of achieving the coherent application of force in different ways at different levels in pursuit of strategic objectives. It is quite possible, for example, to apply force offensively at one level, while being defensive at another, both being entirely consistent with a campaign's ultimate objective. The 1982 Falklands War was an example of a campaign employing tactically offensive means for a strategically defensive end (the recovery of British territory in accordance with the inherent right of self defence incorporated in Article 51 of the UN Charter). In the Battle of the Atlantic during the Second World War, convoying was at the same time both operationally offensive and tactically defensive. The grand strategic purpose was to achieve the effective supply of the home base, with the military strategic objective being the defence of trans-Atlantic shipping. However, the marshalling of merchant vessels in a convoy had the effect of creating a 'honey-pot' that attracted Germany's U-boats into a concentrated anti-submarine warfare trap. This proved to be an operationally offensive measure even though the immediate tactical purpose of the anti-submarine surface escorts and RAF Coastal Command aircraft was the defence of the convoy.


The essence of planning at each level is to identify the desired *end*, the *ways* in which it is to be achieved, and adequate *means* of achieving it. If this cannot be done at any particular level, the issue needs to be balanced at the next level above. Thus, planning at the different levels is very closely linked and interdependent. In practice the levels overlap and the distinctions between them will rarely be tidy. Three important issues emerge about the ways these levels interact:

- There is never any clear line drawn between them; they invariably over-lap (see Figure 1a), a factor commanders need to bear in mind, especially when establishing


the levels of command in which clear distinctions reflecting divisions of responsibility need to be drawn.

- They were developed with war in mind, although they can also apply to all forms of military operation, from warfighting itself to the most benign humanitarian aid operations.
- In some operations, for example Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and during the management of complex confrontations, action taken at the lowest tactical level may need to be especially responsive to strategic decision-making, with the tactical outcome having immediate strategic significance. This may lead to political and military leaders at the strategic level wishing directly to influence the lowest tactical, missing out the intermediate operational and higher tactical levels of command (see Figure 1b).

At times, the Levels of War may appear to be almost an irrelevance. While the strategic/tactical overlap may be inevitable, given the nature of some operations, it does threaten the essential command and control structure and can undermine the principles of mission command, one of the essential elements of British doctrine (see further discussion in Chapters 3 and 7). There can be no hard and fast rule in relation to the application of the strict hierarchy of the Levels of War. Pragmatism applied to the prevailing politico-military circumstances will be the key, although political and military leaders at the strategic level should be discouraged from attempting directly to influence tactical activity.



**Figure 1a**



**Figure 1b**

### The Levels of War

## **MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICY AND DOCTRINE**

Policy is the nation's response to the prevailing strategic environment, reflecting the Government's judgement on what is necessary and possible in pursuit of the national interest. Policy exists at different levels. There is a national, integrated policy for the conduct of external affairs and relations, and national security. This is the business of several Government departments and is determined, ultimately, by the Cabinet. This level of policy falls within the realm of grand strategy. Within it sits Defence Policy, which itself provides guidance for more detailed policy being made within the Ministry of Defence, at the military strategic level and below. Policy can be both fluid and enduring. It must be capable of rapid review if strategic circumstances alter. Nevertheless, in response to the more stable and less dynamic features of the strategic environment, it may also take on an enduring quality of its own that will have an inevitable influence on strategic thinking in the round – including the development of military strategic doctrine.

BDD is concerned primarily with the military strategic level and has an important relationship with Defence Policy. In contrast with the potentially fluid and changeable nature of policy, military strategic level doctrine is informed by fundamental lessons learned over time about the ways in which military forces can be used effectively in support of policy. Doctrine is more enduring and less subject to change, although it is by no means rigid or inflexible. The hierarchy of military doctrine produced in the UK is a guide to military commanders on the conduct of campaigns and operations and the tactical employment of armed forces in support of national policy.

The UK's military strategy draws together Defence Policy (which must reflect the realities of the strategic environment) and military strategic doctrine (which provides guidance on the military means of support for policy). An alternative way of defining military strategy is to describe it as the bridge linking policy and operational effect. As such, it consists of an approach to the delivery of policy within the prevailing strategic circumstances. Military strategy is, therefore, a reflection of both *what* the UK's Armed Forces will do and *how* they will do it.

Within the realm of strategy there is always a complex relationship between doctrine and policy, with each having an influence on the other. Defence Policy, representing HM Government's considered response to the strategic environment, is the principal source of direction for the Armed Forces. Policy is undoubtedly influenced by what is militarily possible (and in that sense is influenced by military strategic doctrine). However, military doctrine at all levels must be developed in a manner consistent with the demands of Defence Policy.

Defence Policy is articulated in the form of Defence Missions which give structure to the goals of the Armed Forces. Those missions are underpinned by the Defence Capabilities discussed in Chapter 4.

## **CHAPTER TWO - THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT**

Strategy is the combination of policy and doctrine that constitutes the nation's response to the prevailing strategic environment. There are many ways of analysing the strategic environment. None is ideal seen from every perspective. Strategic analysis is, in parts, a profoundly subjective process. It is because the strategic environment does not lend itself to objective analysis that each state regards it in a different light and reacts to it in different ways. The resultant differing interpretations of national interest produce the dynamics of international politics and lead to the uncertainty that renders armed forces necessary as a strategic insurance policy. It is within those dynamics that military forces have their utility. How they are employed is emphatically a matter for judgement.

The UK Ministry of Defence's chosen way of analysing the strategic environment is to focus on its different dimensions, discussing each in turn and then drawing all together in an overall description of the world as seen from the British perspective. The aim is to identify the extent of the probable while also bearing in mind the most challenging possibilities. Strategic Analysis is undertaken in a rolling programme by the Central Staff in the Ministry of Defence with the results promulgated in a Strategic Context Paper. The results of that analysis will vary over time as circumstances change and it would be inappropriate to provide any analysis in a doctrinal publication that is meant to endure. However, the seven dimensions of the strategic environment can be identified with brief comment on each, merely to illustrate the main framework of the strategic analysis undertaken.

### **THE DIMENSIONS OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

The strategic environment is massively complex. The dimensions discussed below provide a means by which that complexity is analysed. None is regarded in isolation. Nor are they listed in any order of priority because the importance of each will vary relative to the others as circumstances change. It is also important to recognise that the brief discussion under each heading is merely exploratory and by no means an exhaustive summary of the issues taken into account.

#### **Political**

Which states are allies, which are potential enemies, which have priority and which are of less importance? The UK gauges how to deal with all, treating each in a unique way depending on its particular perspective on the strategic environment. Alliances and coalitions, both for and against, and the states that remain detached and unaligned, represent the shifting patterns of international relations. The regional perspectives superimposed on those patterns add to the complexity of international politics. Yet more complexity is added by the activities of groups not representing states: terrorist

factions, breakaway insurgent groups and others whose identities may be fluid and whose activities do not necessarily assume the same characteristics as those initiated by states.

### **Economic**

Economics is about resources and the relative wealth and deprivation generated in their shadow. The stakes can be very high indeed and economic factors will surely continue to be a major source of dispute and friction. Economic factors come into play at all levels. Despite globalisation and the development of a truly international economy on many levels - or, indeed, because of that - economics remain an important instrument of national policy, to be used in concert with diplomatic and military instruments in pursuit of the national interest.

### **Military**

Military factors include the fighting power of all those states that have significance in relation to the strategic environment as the UK perceives it. This includes allies and potential coalition partners as well as potential adversaries. It also includes consideration of the ways in which military force might be applied. In that respect it is concerned with novel techniques of warfighting, with the employment of asymmetric methods of warfare and with the potential strategic impact of any level of military capability.

### **Physical**

The permanent features of the globe – the mountains, rivers, valleys, lakes, oceans, islands, straits – coupled with the fluctuating elements of the natural environment – the weather, the seasons, the unpredictability of the oceans – are the elements of the strategic environment that are least subject to the immediate influence of man. The potential impact of such issues as ‘global warming’ and the diminishing reserves of fossil fuels is less the concern of current doctrine than it is the business of future conceptual thinking. Nevertheless, the geo-strategic consequences of the physical features and characteristics of the globe should never be taken for granted. Nor should demographic influences - population centres appear fixed but large scale movements of people can have a profound influence on the strategic environment.

### **Scientific and Technical**

Both science and technology are developing rapidly and often provide solutions to many problems. An understanding of the technology available and the extent to which it provides novel solutions is a vital attribute to be deployed at all levels. Nevertheless, the positive consequences of scientific and technological development are not always as profound as the most enthusiastic advocates claim. Developments

bring both advances and additional problems. As an example, enhanced communications techniques pose a threat to the idea of delegation at the core of mission command and can also swamp the military commander with so much data that he has difficulty analysing it. It is important to acknowledge that reliance on sophisticated technologies creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities - for both the UK and potential adversaries.

### **Social and Cultural**

Domestic support is a vital element in the maintenance of morale within the Armed Forces, especially when engaged on operations. Indeed, the strength of public support at home is the foundation for the effective use over time of military forces in the world at large. Very often the news media (television, radio, newspapers) will not merely reflect events but will drive them forward by their influence on public opinion.

The great socio-cultural divisions in international society are generally well known and understood but it is often the not so obvious that emerge suddenly and unexpectedly with disastrous consequences. These cannot be predicted with any certainty. Importantly, it is such societal divisions that seem to have the greatest potential to generate terrorist activity.

### **Legal, Ethical and Moral**

The international political system developed a great deal during the twentieth century, not least through the establishment of a plethora of international organisations. The resultant 'expansion of international society' has been both cause and effect of a substantial increase in the scope and content of international law and concern about ethical and moral issues, not least that relating to human rights. Such issues can have a significant influence on the decision to use force, with the developing law of armed conflict representing one of the restraining influences on the conduct of military operations once that decision has been made (discussed further in Chapter 5).

## **NATIONAL INTEREST**

Just as the assessment of the strategic environment is subjective, so too is the definition of national interests within it. There is general political consensus about the *essential* interests concerned with the territorial integrity and political independence of the state. Moving beyond those, into the realm of *vital* interests, there is more scope for interpretation. By the time *marginal* interests require definition, there is not only scope for choice but also the potential for much disagreement. It is not the role of the military to define national interest; that is a political function, albeit one that involves the Ministry of Defence as a department of state. However, the UK's military strategic doctrine has to be sufficiently flexible to cope with shifts in perceptions of

national interest reflected in policy. Those perceptions will not only change over time, they will be different to different groups within the state.

## **THE INSTRUMENTS OF GRAND STRATEGY**

Politics is about the capacity to influence the behaviour of others. The conduct of international politics is about applying national power, within the international political system, in support of national and collective interest, usually in conjunction with allies and partners. The objectives being pursued, combined with the manner of their pursuit, constitutes the nation's grand strategy. The British grand strategic position is a reflection of the realities of power as exercised within the international political system. Central to it is an understanding of the essential trinity of diplomacy, economic power and military power, each of which equates to an instrument of national policy.

### **The Diplomatic Instrument**

The diplomatic power of persuasion results from a wide range of attributes: the ability to negotiate, to broker agreements, to massage relationships between one's allies and potential partners and generally to get one's way by force of argument rather than by resort to purely economic or military means. Effective diplomacy relies on a combination of reputation, integrity and both economic and military substance backing up the skills necessary to turn them into influence. The diplomatic instrument is constantly in use, including during war when the need to apply influence on allies and neutrals is as essential as the need to apply military force against one's enemies in physical defence of the nation's interests.

### **The Economic Instrument**

Overseas investments and the ebb and flow of capital and trade provide scope for the exercise of economic influence. The economic instrument is multi-faceted. As with all instruments of policy, economic action has to be used appropriately and in conducive circumstances. One aspect of it is that involving the imposition of economic sanctions. This is invariably controversial, as it is seldom prompt and precise in its effect within the globalised economy and because success is difficult to gauge. In extreme circumstances the economic instrument may require the application of military force to give effect to it, through embargo operations to enforce economic sanctions, for example.

### **The Military Instrument**

Military power is the ultimate instrument of policy – the instrument to be brought into play when other means require reinforcement or have failed in some way to protect

national interests. The status of military power and the ultimate warfighting ability with which it endows the state, is well reflected in Clausewitz's dictum that "*war is nothing but the continuation of political relations by other means.*" However, the UK must also be conscious of the usefulness (and limitations) of military forces in conflict prevention, including through defence diplomacy.

## **THE ESSENCE OF GRAND STRATEGY**

The key to the successful conduct of the external relations of the state is the considered use of the most appropriate mix of instruments in the circumstances. The diplomatic, economic and military instruments each have to be used in relation to the others with a coordinated Cross Government Information Campaign being used to enhance their effectiveness. Although diplomatic means are always employed, they often require economic or military actions to support and enhance their effect. Indeed, it will very often be the case that diplomatic means are only successful because they are backed up with an implicit or declared threat to use other means if diplomacy fails. Any threat, no matter how it is communicated, must be credible and must be capable of being carried out if the conditions warrant it. To be an effective instrument of grand strategy, the military instrument must be maintained and developed in a manner consistent with the demands that are likely to be placed upon it. It will never operate in isolation but only as part of a fully co-ordinated and coherent grand strategy in which the diplomatic and economic instruments will be as important in their way as the military forces and the military strategy supporting them.

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**PART II**

**THE**

**BRITISH APPROACH**

**TO MILITARY**

**OPERATIONS**

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## **CHAPTER THREE – THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF BRITISH DOCTRINE**

British doctrine, at all levels, is the best estimation of the way the UK's Armed Forces, and those who command them, should go about their military business. Doctrine is not merely a record of past practice, it is an assessment of the best approach based on a sound understanding of current imperatives and lessons learned from past experience – both the good and the bad. It is dangerous, however, to assume that past success necessarily provides the best route for the future. Indeed, successful past practice may contain the seeds of future disaster if applied rigidly in different circumstances. The development of sound doctrine is, therefore, as much to do with challenging received wisdom as it is with codifying established practice.

Those in command, at whatever level, have to rely on their judgement and apply as much of what they have learnt as appropriate, departing from the established route when the circumstances demand it. Within the UK's Armed Forces, doctrine not only allows for that, it positively encourages it. Well-developed doctrine provides the foundation of the British approach. It is inherently flexible, allowing commanders to seize the initiative and adopt unorthodox or imaginative courses of action as the opportunities arise. For the UK to take full advantage of the collective experience and talents of its senior military commanders, they must be allowed the scope to exercise their initiative. The doctrine in this book is about a way of thinking, not about what one must think. Key themes that permeate down through the joint doctrine hierarchy from British Defence Doctrine to the tactical level include:

- the Principles of War
- the warfighting ethos
- the manoeuvrist approach
- the application of mission command
- the joint, integrated and multinational nature of operations
- the inherent flexibility and pragmatism of British doctrine

### **THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR**

In planning for war and in executing that plan, commanders and their staffs at all levels need to take certain principles into consideration. The individual principles described below are not rigid laws but provide guidance on which military action will be based. Their relevance, applicability and relative importance change with the circumstance: their application with judgement and common sense will lead to success, blatant disregard of them involves risk and could lead to failure. This in itself is a sound reason why commanders must remain flexible in their thinking.

## **The Selection and Maintenance of the Aim**

In the conduct of war as a whole, and in every operation within it, it is essential to select and clearly define the aim. The ultimate aim in war is to break the enemy's will to fight. Each phase of the war and each separate operation is directed towards this supreme aim, but will have a more limited aim, which must be clearly defined, simple and direct. Once the aim is decided, all efforts are directed to its attainment until a changed situation calls for re-appreciation and probably a new aim. Every plan or action must be tested by its bearing on the chosen aim. The selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the 'Master Principle'. It has therefore been placed first in the list. The remaining principles are not given in any particular order since their relative importance varies according to the nature of the operation.

## **Maintenance of Morale**

Success in war often depends more on moral than on physical qualities. Numbers, armament and resources cannot compensate for lack of courage, energy, determination, skill and the bold offensive spirit that springs from a national determination to succeed. The development and subsequent maintenance of the qualities of morale are, therefore, essential to success in war.

## **Offensive Action**

Offensive action is the necessary forerunner of success; it may be delayed, but until the initiative is seized and the offensive taken, success is unlikely.

## **Security**

A sufficient degree of security is essential in order to obtain freedom of action to launch a bold offensive in pursuit of the selected aim. This entails adequate defence of high value assets and information that are vital to the nation or the armed forces. Security does not, however, imply undue caution and avoidance of all risks, for bold action is essential to success in war. On the contrary, with security provided for, unexpected developments are unlikely to interfere seriously with the pursuit of a vigorous offensive.

## **Surprise**

Surprise is a most effective and powerful influence in war and its moral effect is very great. Every endeavour is made to surprise the enemy and to guard against being surprised. By the use of surprise, results out of all proportion to the efforts expended can be obtained and, in some operations, when other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to success. Surprise can be achieved strategically, operationally,

tactically or by exploiting new material. The elements of surprise are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity and rapidity.

### **Concentration of Force**

To achieve success in war, it is essential to concentrate superior force, moral and material, to that of the enemy at the decisive time and place. Concentration does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather having them so disposed as to be able to unite to deliver the decisive blow when and where required, or to counter the enemy's threats. Concentration is more a matter of time than of space – and has more to do with the effects it has than on the massing of force for its own sake.

### **Economy of Effort**

Economy of effort implies a balanced employment of forces and a judicious expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and place.

### **Flexibility**

Modern war demands a high degree of flexibility to enable pre-arranged plans to be altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments. This entails good training, organization, discipline and staff work and, above all, that flexibility of mind and rapidity of decision on the part of the commander and his subordinates which ensures that time is never lost. It also calls for physical mobility of a high order, strategically, operationally and tactically, so that our forces can be concentrated rapidly and economically at decisive places and times.

### **Co-operation**

Co-operation is based on team spirit and entails the co-ordination of all units so as to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. Above all, goodwill and the desire to co-operate are essential at all levels. The increased interdependence of the individual Services and their increasing mutual dependence on the armed forces of allies and potential coalition partners, has made co-operation between them of vital importance in modern warfare. It is frequently also necessary to co-operate closely with other non-governmental agencies, many of which will have aims and objectives seemingly at variance with those promulgated in the military plan.

### **Sustainability**

The logistics and administrative arrangements are invariably crucial to success. They should be designed to give the commander maximum freedom of action in carrying out the plan. The logistics and administrative organization should be kept as simple as

possible with Component Commanders having a degree of control over logistics and administration within their sphere of command, corresponding to their responsibilities for the operational plan.

## **THE WARFIGHTING ETHOS**

The nature of British doctrine is a product of military imperatives. Those imperatives lead ultimately to the need to prepare for and, if necessary, to fight and win in warfare. The UK acknowledges this as the most important function its Armed Forces may have to perform. Every member of the Armed Forces must be prepared to fight and die for whatever legitimate cause the UK is pursuing through military endeavour. It follows also that doctrine must have at its core a warfighting ethos. War is a most bloody and destructive business. Essentially it is about the deliberate application of lethal violence, usually by two sides against each other but increasingly in more complex patterns. Because of the destructive nature of warfighting, those involved are forced to endure a constant threat to their lives and well-being. They will themselves be attempting to create the same fear in the minds of their enemy. The dynamic and destructive nature of this exchange produces massive uncertainty, confusion, chaos and an inevitable abandonment of initial plans for the conduct of the war. With both sides attempting to gain advantage, surprise and shock will be a constant drain on resources, both physical and mental. For those who have not experienced it, it will be difficult to imagine just how demanding and frightening a process war is. No one can be sure how he or she will react to war. Fear is commonplace, even within the minds of those most conditioned to cope with its challenges; courage and leadership coupled with unit cohesion and discipline are the best counters to that fear. The bravest men and women are frightened; it is their ability to carry on despite their fears that is the measure of their courage. Importantly, by its very nature, military activity is about confronting risk and managing it. It is emphatically never about avoiding risk; the military profession is not one for those who are risk averse.


The Armed Forces, admittedly, do many other things in addition to fighting wars. In recent years in particular, their ability to mount, conduct and sustain a wide range of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) has led to extensive and prolonged involvement in activities not directly related to the maintenance of the UK's own political independence and territorial integrity. The nature of these operations must not be allowed to divert the Armed Forces from the reality that their success in them has been based on their ability to escalate the level of force they deliver when the circumstances demand it. There is but one certainty in relation to warfare – there is no such thing as a casualty or risk free conflict and the ethos at the core of British doctrine reflects that reality. A warfighting ethos provides the UK's Armed Forces with the vital moral and emotional capacity to cope with all the circumstances they are likely to confront. It also prepares public opinion for the possibility of casualties in pursuit of a legitimate

and justifiable cause, especially when that cause is a matter of choice and not fundamental to the UK's own national defence.

## **THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH**

The manoeuvrist approach to operations is one in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel, is paramount. Manoeuvre warfare is the application of manoeuvrist thinking to warfighting. It aims to apply strength against identified vulnerabilities. Significant features are momentum and tempo, which in combination lead to shock action and surprise. Emphasis is on defeat and disruption of the enemy by taking the initiative and applying constant and unacceptable pressure at the times and places the enemy least suspects, rather than attempting to seize and hold ground for its own sake. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed.

Manoeuvrist thinking is equally applicable to all types of military operation. Such thinking offers the prospect of rapid results or of results disproportionately greater than the resources applied. Hence it is attractive to a numerically inferior side or to a stronger side that wishes to minimise the resources committed. However, it does entail the risk that disruption of the enemy will not occur as predicted and hence can be less certain than an operation which relies on the use of overwhelming force as a means of destruction. In practice, direct and indirect forms of attack are not exclusive styles of warfare and any strategy is likely to contain elements of each. Similarly, the manoeuvrist approach does not preclude the use of attrition. A key characteristic of the manoeuvrist approach is the attacking of the enemy commander's decision making process by attempting to get inside his decision making cycle (often described as the 'OODA Loop' - see Figure 3.1), thus achieving a superior operational tempo. This involves presenting him with the need to make decisions at a faster rate than that with which he can cope, so that he takes increasingly inappropriate action, or none at all, thereby paralysing his capability to react. Clearly, any degradation of the overall command system which can be achieved by physical or other means hastens the onset of paralysis.



**Figure 3.1 – The ‘OODA Loop’**

### **The Elements of Operational Art**

To achieve victory, those commanding at all levels of warfare need to comprehend the ways in which the enemy’s military force is structured and deployed, and what are its inherent strengths and weaknesses. The Armed Forces use a range of planning tools to provide coherence in the analysis of the enemy and the development of the campaign plan. These include the centre of gravity, decisive points, the culminating point, branches and sequels, and lines of operation. Knowledge of these and an understanding of their fundamental significance are essential pre-requisites for the effective application of manoeuvrist thinking. They are mostly of relevance at the operational level and are explained in detail in JWP 0-10 *United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations (UKOPSDOC)*.

The centre of gravity, which has considerable relevance at the military strategic level, is the combination of characteristics, capabilities or localities from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Examples are: the enemy’s leadership; the mass of an enemy army; the enemy’s command structure; public opinion and national will; or an alliance or coalition structure. There may be both strategic and operational centres of gravity (although there can only be one at each level). Success at both levels is achieved through identifying and neutralising or destroying the enemy’s centre of gravity and identifying and protecting one’s own. At the higher strategic level, one’s own centre of gravity may be the cohesion of the alliance or coalition. The concept is central to modern interpretations of manoeuvre warfare. A measure of caution is appropriate, however: it is often easier for military historians to identify where a centre of gravity was than for a military commander to identify where the centre of gravity actually is at any given time.

## **MISSION COMMAND**

A sound philosophy of command has four enduring tenets. It requires timely decision-making, a clear understanding of the superior commander's intention, an ability on the part of subordinates to meet the superior's remit, and the commander's determination to see the plan through to a successful conclusion. This requires a style of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action and initiative, but which is responsive to superior direction. Mission command is the British way of achieving this. It has the following key elements:

- First, a commander ensures that his subordinates understand his intentions, their own missions, and the strategic, operational and tactical context.
- Second, subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it is necessary.
- Third, subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.
- Fourth, a commander uses a minimum of control so as not to limit unnecessarily his subordinate's freedom of action.
- Finally, subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their missions.

## **THE JOINT, INTEGRATED AND MULTINATIONAL NATURE OF OPERATIONS**

All components of the UK's Armed Forces have the potential to offer ways and means of enhancing manoeuvrist operations. To do this most effectively, all are allowed to play to their particular strengths in order to make their unique contribution. Maritime, land and air forces have different but complementary attributes that are amplified in maritime, military and air power doctrine. These are: the access, mobility, versatility, sustained reach, resilience, lift capacity, forward presence, poise and leverage of maritime forces; land forces' capacity for shock action, protection, the ability to take and hold ground and endurance; and air power's flexibility, penetration, perspective, speed, responsiveness and reach. These are the inherent strengths and they are used to overcome relative weaknesses, both those that are themselves inherent and those that arise for reasons of circumstance or situation. Land forces, for example, may experience difficulties on their own in achieving surprise in time because the terrain and physical features may severely restrict mobility. In such circumstances, a combination of air-lift and maritime mobility may enable them to move significant distances and re-deploy to maximum effect, catching the opposition unawares.

Joint and integrated operations are not simply a matter of forces from different arms of the armed forces and people from other agencies and organisations operating in the same area. One vital key to the effective command of joint manoeuvrist operations is recognition of the relative strengths and weaknesses (both inherent and situational) of each component of the force and the playing of each to its strengths in support of the others. In doing this, the commander must concentrate on the effects he needs to generate and employ the best means possible of achieving them. This will often require lateral thinking and the employment of units in ways not traditionally associated with their principal operating environment. By adopting an effects based approach to operations and utilising all elements in an integrated fashion, the value of a joint force is more than merely the sum of its component parts. To achieve this requires an instinctive joint state of mind. This is only achieved when all are working effectively and harmoniously with those from the other Services, from the Civil Service and from other nations in pursuit of a common purpose. By ‘effectively and harmoniously’ is meant not merely the ability to get along with each other and obtain the lowest common denominator of agreement or the acceptance of joint doctrine. It means having an ability to deal with complexity, to have specialist understanding of a high order and to apply that in the joint arena. A pivotal role is played by civilian staffs in the planning of operations and, in particular, at the military strategic level where the political and military come together as at no other level. While the application of military force at the tactical level is essentially a military and not a civilian function, its effective delivery will depend on all components – military and civil – functioning as one entity.

Increasingly today the activities of military forces depend not only on joint endeavour but also on their ability to coordinate and work with a plethora of civilian agencies, both governmental and non-governmental. The full integration of military operations into an overall pattern of activity in the Joint Operations Area is crucial. While the military aims and objectives are relatively straightforward to identify through the campaign planning processes, these will often appear inconsistent and incompatible with the aims and objectives of many other agencies. Nevertheless, for the successful pursuit of the campaign objective commanders need to work towards an integrated approach, taking into account the need for co-operation without the benefit of command and control. This requires a fluid and flexible approach to others who have a legitimate role in the area and a willingness to shape decisions taking into account the needs of others.

Finally, the ability to operate with the armed forces of other nations is an essential quality to be deployed on operations. The UK may still, from time to time, deploy forces on its own, without support from other allies or coalition partners. However, those occasions are likely to be rare and, in much the same way as different components bring different attributes and limitations to a joint campaign, so allies and coalition partners will do likewise. A clear understanding of the ways in which other

nations' armed forces operate and the ability to merge units from several nations into one cohesive force, are increasingly important factors in the conduct of military operations.

## **FLEXIBILITY AND PRAGMATISM**

Perhaps not surprisingly, the final theme is the duality of flexibility and pragmatism. Manoeuvrist operations require a conditioned and resilient attitude of mind developed through experience in training and, if possible, in practice. They also require considerable thought and imagination in both planning and execution. Commanders must be conditioned to think constantly of new ways of approaching an objective. Imaginative and innovative thinking is the true source of initiative; initiative generates success. To allow for such thinking, British doctrine adopts a flexible approach in two ways. First, it is constantly reviewed and reconsidered and, if found wanting, is changed to reflect the developing military environment. Second, and in many ways more important, it allows for deviation. Dogma – the resort of the idle and unimaginative mind – is anathema. Doctrine is promulgated for guidance only, not for slavish adherence. An intelligent and talented commander faced with unique circumstances will always be better placed than the writer of doctrine to assess the most appropriate way of achieving his objective. As T E Lawrence observed: *“Nine-tenths of tactics are certain and taught in books; but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals.”* The recognition of this leads to a pragmatic attitude that eschews the formulaic and prescriptive in favour of the unpredictable and surprising. This combination of flexibility and pragmatism is absolutely necessary for the successful conduct of the modern range of military operations. It is reflected in British doctrine by the simple expedient of avoiding obligatory prescriptive rules while encouraging a distinctive way of thinking about military operations.

## **SUMMARISING THE BRITISH APPROACH**

The themes outlined above are fundamental. Woven together they represent the British approach to military operations in the round. Retention of a **warfighting ethos** is central, ready to be applied if the circumstances demand it. In PSOs, for example, it is what gives the UK's Armed Forces the ability to establish a base of influence from which both they and other agencies can operate. **Joint, integrated and multinational** operations are the means by which the UK's full range of capabilities and attributes are brought to bear. The UK's Armed Forces operate together as a coherent entity to maximise their ability to deliver operational effect. In doing this they are guided by the **Principles of War** which are as applicable at the strategic level as they are at the tactical and which are as relevant in PSOs as they are to warfighting. The intelligent application of the Principles of War is a fundamental element of the **manoeuvrist approach** that results in commanders being allowed and encouraged to prosecute their

objectives using methods of their own choosing through a **flexible and pragmatic** state of mind. To do this they need the necessary means. By this is meant not only the physical means – men, equipment and other tangible resources – but also the command conditions inherent in **mission command** that are conducive to seizing the initiative, obtaining the advantage of tempo and achieving surprise. These six themes represent the core of the British Approach to operations. They permeate down through the full hierarchy of doctrine and must be reflected in all aspects of training and preparation.

## CHAPTER FOUR - FIGHTING POWER

Fighting power defines armed forces' ability to fight and achieve success in operations. It is made up of an essential mix of three inter-related components: conceptual, moral and physical. None is invariably more important than the others, although, as Napoleon supposedly once remarked "*the moral is to the material as three is to one*". It matters not how advanced one's platforms, weapons and sensors are if the people manning them lack motivation, training or adequate leadership.

### THE CONCEPTUAL COMPONENT

The conceptual component provides the thought processes needed to develop the ability to fight. It comprises both lessons from the past and thinking about how the Armed Forces can best operate today and in the future. The conceptual component of fighting power *today* consists of two elements: the principles of war and the body of doctrine. It is the combination of those principles and doctrine, applied with imagination and initiative by their commanders, that provides the intellectual force driving the UK Armed Forces' fighting power in current operations.

#### The Principles of War

The Principles of War were discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Their origins can be traced back to Sun Tzu, they were inherent in Clausewitz's writing, they were first promulgated within the British Armed Forces in the inter-war years, and they achieved their current form under Montgomery's direction immediately after the Second World War. There is a notable degree of consistency throughout all previous iterations of the Principles and, in their collective form, they remain applicable to this day. They are the foundation upon which British doctrine is constructed.

#### Doctrine

There are four categories of doctrine providing guidance to the Armed Forces: joint doctrine; higher level environmental doctrine; single Service doctrine; and NATO doctrine.

**Joint Doctrine.** This is contained in the hierarchy of Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs). *British Defence Doctrine* is the highest level of joint doctrine. It focuses on the military strategic level of war, but contains comment on both the grand strategic and operational levels. The principal operational level publication is *UKOPSDOC*. Warfare at the military strategic and operational levels is inherently joint; so too is the doctrine relating to it. While not all operations at the tactical level are necessarily joint, there is a large body of joint tactical doctrine that represents the bulk of the joint doctrine hierarchy.

**Higher Level Environmental Doctrine.** Both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force produce high level doctrine publications (BR1806 *British Maritime Doctrine* and AP3000 *British Air Power Doctrine*). Despite their single Service orientation, these deal principally with the military strategic and operational levels and are best described as single Service perspectives on joint doctrine at those levels.<sup>1</sup> They describe the ways and means of operating in the maritime and air environments.

**Single Service Tactical Doctrine.** Some elements of tactical doctrine are, by their nature, exclusively single-Service. They remain the responsibility of the single Services, but are consistent with joint doctrine.

**NATO Doctrine.** NATO is by far the most important security arrangement for the UK; it is the principal organisation through which the UK conducts military activities. A substantial amount of operational and tactical level environmental doctrine is produced by NATO, with all three Services using it, as appropriate, for guidance.

### **Conceptual Thinking**

There is a further essential element that assists with the development of fighting power into the *future*. It is concerned with innovation and ideas for developing future capabilities and better ways of operating in a continually fluctuating strategic environment. The development of concepts for future operations is vital for both force and doctrine development. Without it, the Armed Forces could not maintain fighting power, including equipment superiority, over time. In thinking about the future of warfare and the forces necessary to cope with its challenges, the UK uses a capability based approach. There are seven fundamental defence capabilities required to deliver fighting power. These are:


- A robust and responsive means of **Command** (the authority for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces).
- A process to **Inform** the command (the acquisition, collation, processing, management and distribution of information).
- A means to **Prepare** forces for employment (all the activities needed to define, resource and deliver fighting power for operational employment, within readiness criteria laid down in policy).
- Measures and resources to **Project** and recover in a timely manner, a force that is appropriately packaged for the objective it is pursuing.

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<sup>1</sup> BDD attends to the Army's needs for higher level doctrine.

- The means to **Protect** and preserve fighting power, principally on operations (involves countering wider threats, natural, human and technological).
- The ability to **Sustain** the force (the maintenance of the necessary level of fighting power required to achieve objectives).
- All of which are necessary in order to discharge the prime function, namely to **Operate** by conducting military actions, primarily in combat (including movement, supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvre).

These fundamental defence capabilities are inter-related and supporting; none can be considered in isolation, and all are required in varying measure to meet the requirements of Government policy. A representation of this multi-dimensional inter-relationship is shown below in Figure 4.1.



**Figure 4.1 – The Seven Fundamental Defence Capabilities**

## THE MORAL COMPONENT

Ultimately it is people that realise fighting power. The UK has highly skilled and fully volunteer Armed Forces with a history of excellence in performance. Their world-recognised strengths require time, effort and resources if they are to be developed, maintained and exploited to the nation's advantage. The moral component of fighting power is about persuading our people to fight. It depends on good morale and the conviction that our purpose is morally and ethically sound; these promote an offensive spirit and a determination to achieve the aim. There are many things that contribute:

training, confidence in equipment, fair and firm discipline, self-respect and a clear understanding of what is going on and what is required. With all of those in place there is clear potential for military success. To draw it out, however, requires motivation, leadership and management.

## **Motivation**

Motivation implies a determination for getting things done. It derives from a personal commitment to an idea, a sense of purpose, and a feeling of belonging. In many people there is an instinctive desire to do what is right and good. One means of generating motivation, therefore, is to ensure that our Armed Forces believe in what they are doing. A sense of purpose is achieved when that belief is linked to the individual's involvement in its pursuit. Involvement is a stronger source of motivation for most people when they feel themselves to be a part of a team, all members of which provide the others with support. In military units, given the challenges inherent in warfighting, the need is to go beyond mere team-building, to develop genuine comradeship that will endure even as the violence and fear of war, death and injury begin to bite deep into an individual's consciousness. It is pride in belonging, best described by the term *esprit de corps* in relation to unit identity but which, at a higher level, includes a belief in patriotic duty. Being highly motivated in peace-time is one thing; to retain that motivation in the face of battle requires a profoundly deep commitment to one's comrades, one's unit, one's country and to the cause for which one is fighting.

## **Leadership**

Leadership at all levels is the principal element in the maintenance of morale. Without good leadership, morale will undoubtedly crumble in the face of adversity. All leaders must accept their responsibility for maintaining morale and the fighting spirit of those under their command. Military leadership is the projection of personality and character to get subordinates to do what is required of them and to engender within them the confidence that breeds initiative and the acceptance of risk and responsibility. Born leaders are rare, but leadership potential can be developed by training, experience, study of the methods of great leaders in the past, and a knowledge of military doctrine. Through these, individuals develop their own style of leadership and no two people will necessarily lead in exactly the same way.

Leadership starts with self-discipline. It is a continuous process throughout training and daily life. Leaders promote this amongst their subordinates by: decisive action; precept and example; advice, encouragement and admonishment; and by giving subordinates every opportunity of contributing to operational and tactical success. It is a truism that operational success provides the quickest and most effective boost to

morale for those at war, but outstanding leadership will sustain high morale when all other factors are against it.

## **Management**

Management is no substitute for leadership but is a vital element of the moral component nevertheless. It is about making the best use of resources. It is an attribute of command that cannot be overlooked because it is fundamental to efficiency and, of course, relates to two Principles of War, economy of effort and sustainability. In those senses, especially in relation to logistics, it also has a bearing on the physical component of fighting power. It is regarded as an element of the moral component, however, because without good management of resources and the provision of sufficient administrative support, the maintenance of morale and the motivation of the force would be rendered considerably more difficult. The measure of good management is the ability to achieve the right balance – neither an over-abundance nor a shortage of resources, either of which would undermine the concentration of effort on the main objective.

## **THE PHYSICAL COMPONENT**

The physical component of fighting power is the means to fight. It has five elements: manpower, equipment, collective performance, readiness and sustainability. It is, therefore, a combination of the ships, land vehicles, aircraft, associated weapons and sensors, and other equipments, the people that man them and the training they undergo to fight, both as individuals and as members of operational units, in order that they can be deployed in good time and sustained to achieve the tasks assigned by HM Government.

## **Manpower**

The servicemen and servicewomen that comprise our Armed Forces, both regular and reserve, are highly trained and skilled volunteers. They go through a rigorous selection and initial training process that gives them an essential grounding for the further professional development and collective training necessary to turn them into effective combatants. The UK's Armed Forces have been involved in active operations throughout the period since the Second World War and have accumulated a wealth of experience, with many of those with that experience still serving. They are highly regarded internationally. Nevertheless, their skills need to be nurtured, developed and retained. No matter how successful they might have been in the past, their effectiveness can so easily be undermined by changing economic, social and political factors and by significant shifts in the values of society as a whole.

## **Equipment**

The UK's Armed Forces go to war and fight with the equipment they already have and British doctrine reflects that. However, a fundamental part of maintaining fighting power is the procurement of the best and most effective equipment that can be afforded, the aim being to maintain a technological advantage that represents a war-winning capability. The conceptual component of fighting power includes the development of concepts to inform and guide the UK's equipment programme and to develop fighting power into the future. It is essential that those in the Defence industries understand the British Approach to military operations in order that they can better anticipate the UK Armed Forces' equipment needs. Equally, interaction with industry enables the Armed Forces to achieve a better understanding of the capabilities that might be employed by potential adversaries.

## **Collective Performance**

Collective performance is only achieved through an understanding of common doctrine combined with collective training and exercising to rehearse and sharpen the ability to apply it. Commanders devise ways of ensuring that the forces under their command are as prepared as possible for the ultimate demands of warfighting. There can be no compromise on this, for the ability to deploy fully prepared for combat is at the core of fighting power.


## **Readiness**

The ability to deploy combines the physical process of transit into a Joint Operations Area with the readiness to do so in as short a time as possible. By their nature, crises spring up unexpectedly in equally unexpected places. Timelines are likely to be short. Government policy lays down readiness criteria for the Armed Forces, in which priorities are listed and forces allocated differing levels of required readiness. The readiness details are themselves a part of policy and not doctrine, but a commander's responsibility to meet them is a doctrinal imperative.

## **Sustainability**

Sustaining military forces in war is as vital a function as their ability to deliver firepower. As soon as an operation starts, events will generate further demands on the force. It cannot be assumed that a campaign plan will survive the first encounter with the enemy. This is why the ability to sustain is so important a part of fighting power.

The Components of Fighting Power are summarised diagrammatically below:



**Figure 4.2 - The Components of Fighting Power**

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## CHAPTER FIVE – WARFARE AND THE UTILITY OF FIGHTING POWER

The ultimate purpose of the UK's Armed Forces is the defence of the nation and its overseas territories. Expressed in terms of national interest, the political independence and territorial integrity of the state represents the core or *essential* interest. More generally, the UK's Armed Forces exist to defend British interests in the wider world, be they of *vital* or merely *marginal* importance. The identification of national interests and their placing in order of priority is a matter for Government Policy, with the Armed Forces available to be employed as an instrument of that policy, either directly or as a backdrop to other diplomatic or economic measures.

Defence is a legitimate function for the Armed Forces. The inherent right of self-defence under customary international law is preserved by Article 51 of the UN Charter. This right includes the right of collective defence, which is at the heart of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Effective defence is achieved by demonstrating an ability to use military force and applying it legitimately with destructive and, if necessary, lethal effect, under political direction. The most desirable aim is to avoid war or other forms of armed conflict. That is not always possible, however.

### DETERRENCE AND COERCION

At the heart of the UK's defence posture is the notion of deterrence, the purpose of which is to persuade a potential adversary away from a course of action that threatens British interests. It is applied at all levels, from the strategic down to the tactical, and in defence of all national interests, be they essential, vital or marginal. At the core of deterrence is a capability and overt preparedness such that potential adversaries conclude that the possible benefit to be gained from pursuing a particular course of action is not worth the risk associated with the possible or probable consequences. The deterrent capability must be credible and proportionate - though not necessarily equal - to the threat it is meant to deter: it must be sound and effective; and its potential must be communicated effectively to those in a position to react to it.

The UK's Armed Forces in their entirety comprise the nation's strategic deterrent by being capable of responding to threats against British territory, citizens and interests. It is an imperative that at all levels the deterrent message is conveyed by appropriate means, fashioned to the nature of the particular threat that needs to be deterred. The term 'strategic deterrence' has been especially associated since the 1950s with the threatened use of nuclear weapons to deter attacks on the UK and the NATO Allies. The possession of nuclear weapons is lawful and is judged so far to have been the most effective means of deterring attack by others who possess similar capabilities. Nuclear strategic deterrence represents a particular and legitimate means of achieving deterrence at the strategic level in response to a particularly extreme form of threat. It

has also probably had the effect of deterring conventional aggression because of the risk of escalation across the nuclear threshold inherent in general war between nuclear powers. However, while it is essential to have deployable nuclear weapons to deter certain types of attack on the UK, in most instances deterrence will be achieved through conventional or non-nuclear means.

Leaving the issue of nuclear weapons aside, we must consider a very similar concept to deterrence – coercion. Whereas the purpose of deterrence is to persuade others not to take a particular course of action, coercion seeks to persuade them to do something that they would otherwise not have done. There is often sufficient overlap between them that it is difficult precisely to determine whether it is deterrence or coercion that is the means of persuasion. Often it will be a subtle combination of both. As with deterrence, coercion is of relevance at all levels, from the strategic down to the tactical. Importantly, both deterrence and coercion have defensive purposes, as indeed both may be means of enforcement.

The maintenance of effective fighting power is of fundamental importance to both deterrence and coercion. By maintaining it and demonstrating a willingness to use it through actual and legitimate deployment, the UK effectively communicates its resolve in a more general sense. Neither deterrence nor coercion necessarily requires the application of lethal force, although there is a tendency to assume that deterrence is essentially passive while coercion is often assumed to involve the actual application of force. When the deterrent or coercive posture consists merely of the threat – implied or explicit – to apply force, it is arguably an instance of military potential being used as a backdrop to diplomacy. When diplomacy fails and force is actually applied, its purpose remains either to deter or to coerce, or a subtle combination of the two. When force is being applied, there remains the additional deliberate deterrent or coercive threat of escalation, which brings with it risks of escalation by one's adversary. The risk of escalation inherent in both deterrence and coercion makes it especially important that it is only resorted to after deliberate and considered decision fully consistent with strategic aims and international law.

The combination of deterrence and coercion is the core purpose of military force, whether merely threatened or actually applied. Both are about persuading an adversary to adopt behaviour consistent with our own interests, be they national strategic or in support of tactical objectives. The ability to deter and coerce with real effect at all levels serves not only to protect our own immediate interests but also to reassure allies and partners of our ability to meet our commitments to them. In that sense it is an important backdrop to diplomatic effort. It is the essence of the utility of the military instrument. The most vital underpinning of that instrument and its credibility is the capacity to convert threat into application.

## **APPLYING FORCE: DESTRUCTION AND DENIAL**

If a justifiable threat to apply military force fails either to deter or to coerce, the UK will be likely to consider the application of force. In using force, the overarching purpose remains to either deter or coerce, both being entirely consistent with the support or protection of British interests or objectives. The principal effects of the application of force are destruction and denial.

The most obvious use of military power is the application of force to destroy the enemy's ability to continue, including his will to do so. Force is focused on the enemy's vulnerabilities, with the intention of attacking the enemy's will to carry on. This may include attacks on his own destructive capacity, on his reach, on his morale or on infrastructure supporting his military effort. Such action is not taken merely to destroy the enemy's military assets but to change his policy and to persuade him to either take a particular course of action or to refrain from doing something that is damaging to British interests – coercion or deterrence once more. The aim, therefore, is to undermine the enemy's ability and will to continue, and to do so with the least possible human and economic cost to oneself and in a manner consistent with international law.

Success may be achieved by a systematic application of destructive power to key elements of the enemy's fighting power, thereby denying him the ability to use it himself. However, while destruction is the ultimate form of denial, there are other means of achieving it that leave targets and vital aspects of the battlefield and the enemy's infrastructure intact, often at less cost to oneself. The objective is often to deny the enemy the use of something, while retaining the option to use it oneself. Obstructions laid in the enemy's approaches to a key river crossing could, for example, deny him the use of the bridge while retaining it intact for subsequent use by friendly forces. A submarine deployed in the sea areas adjacent to a key port can deny the use of that port because of the potent threat it poses and the difficulties associated with countering it.

## **CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF MILITARY POWER**

While the physical ability of armed forces to destroy or deny is undisputed, there are several ways in which this ability may be constrained. Some are self-imposed limitations compliant with ethical, moral or political considerations. Some are legally based and derived from the law of armed conflict. Others are the inevitable consequences of the physical environment or the specific circumstances in which military forces find themselves.

## **Political**

Political decisions that limit warfare include those that place limitations on the objectives, those that restrict the theatre of operations to a limited geographical area, those that restrict the types of weapons used, and those that are aimed at avoiding escalation. In reality, there is never likely to be a war that is unlimited in its objectives, the methods by which it is conducted and the theatre in which it is fought. Political constraints on the use of military power are a constant reality.

## **Legal**

The effective application of national and international law governing the conduct of armed conflict<sup>1</sup> relies on a sound knowledge and understanding by those engaged in it, at all levels. The UK's international obligations are derived from customary international law and from the relevant conventions which it has ratified. The most important are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977. Core obligations are that combatants should at all times be distinguished from the civilian population, that only legitimate military objectives may be attacked, and that such attacks must be proportionate (ie that any civilian casualties and damage expected to be caused should not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected as a result of an attack). Responsibility for compliance with the laws of armed conflict rests with combatants, all of whom must have a clear understanding of their obligations.

## **Rules of Engagement**

The means by which political directions are conveyed to military forces at all levels, is by Rules of Engagement (ROE), which are also drawn up to reflect legal considerations. Although the modern concept of ROE was developed within the UK as recently as the 1960s and 1970s, they have become a common feature of modern military operations used by many armed forces around the world. All UK Armed Forces' units on operations are subject to ROE, with all operational naval forces subject to standing ROE no matter what the circumstances. ROE may be used to escalate the degree of force, to de-escalate or to maintain a steady state in potentially fluid situations. The use of sensors and weapons systems is invariably the subject of ROE, although nothing detracts from the inherent right of proportionate and necessary self-defence. Although ROE reflect legal constraints to be applied (both international

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<sup>1</sup>As a legal term of art, 'armed conflict' subsumes within it the notion of 'war'. British military doctrine acknowledges this but continues to use the terms 'war' and 'warfighting' in the traditional military sense that they imply a high degree of intensity of combat and a well developed level of combat capability. The use of these terms in the military doctrinal context does not in any way compromise the UK's strict compliance with the law governing either the resort to force or the conduct of armed conflict once it has broken out. All wars will be 'armed conflict'. However, not all instances of 'armed conflict' will necessarily be regarded as 'warfare' in the traditional military strategic sense. While discussing the legal limitations in this section, the term 'armed conflict' is used in place of 'war'.

and domestic), compliance with ROE does not necessarily imply full compliance with the laws of armed conflict, which remains a matter for personal judgement and responsibility.

### **Physical**

The physical environment can place severe limitations on the conduct of all military operations. As highlighted in Chapter 2, physical considerations are one of the seven dimensions of the strategic environment. The limitations imposed by physical features are not easily overcome, although such actions as the bridging of rivers and the blocking of port approaches can either overcome or extend their influence. Weather can be a major influence on military operations, for both good and ill. Short-term fluctuations in weather will affect tactical employment of forces, while the longer term and more extreme seasonal variations will certainly have operational or strategic effect.

### **Military**

Military limitations include those inherent in the UK's own capabilities and those of allies. Limits may reflect other military commitments in train from which the UK's Armed Forces may not be released. This will be a question of priorities for political decision. In general terms, the UK's Armed Forces go to war with the equipment they have available at the time. If war continues for extended periods it may be possible to develop new techniques, platforms, sensors and weapons specifically for a single conflict. Such was obviously the case during the Second World War when military innovation eventually accounted for a substantial proportion of Allied successes. However, extended periods of general warfare are unusual and the tendency is for operations to be of shorter duration and much lower intensity than that experienced between 1939-45.

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## CHAPTER SIX – THE BROADER UTILITY OF FIGHTING POWER

While it is the ability of the UK's Armed Forces to engage in combat in war that provides them with their *raison d'être*, they can be employed on a wide variety of other operations. For many of these they will require their combat potential but some will be more benign, including those mounted to ameliorate the living conditions of those subject to natural or humanitarian disaster.

### THE SPECTRUM OF TENSION

Neither peace nor war exists in extreme form. Perfect peace is the stuff of utopian dreams; absolute war the unlimited thermonuclear construct of one's worst nightmares. There is a wide range of different situations between war and peace that are frequently given labels like 'tension', 'crisis', 'hostilities', and 'conflict'. The analysis of these various conditions is an essentially subjective process that lends itself to different methods of analysis and produces different resultant descriptions. Some analysts, for example, favour a circular 'continuum of conflict'. However, British doctrine uses the idea of a spectrum of tension, with peace at one extreme and war at the other. Between those two extremes is the wide variety of conditions that represent the bulk of the relationships existing between states. The spectrum is best viewed as a means of illustrating the shifting relationships between states.

#### Identifying Crisis and Stability

The spectrum implies an increasing amount of disagreement, tension and conflict as international relations move from peace towards war. Movement can take place in either direction and may be gradual or rapid. There may also be volatility, with movement first one way and then the other. In contrast, a relationship may remain in the same position for extended periods, in which case there is a measure of stability. Stability is a relative construct, however, and might be a cause for concern if it is achieved at a position on the spectrum too close to war for comfort. That said, two neighbouring states might have a fundamental disagreement but with their relationship remaining stable nevertheless. They may even be allies in other respects.

Crisis comes when stability is lost and there is a perceptible movement along the spectrum towards war (movement the other way also represents instability, but of a more benign nature). In working to prevent conflict attempts are made to move relations along the spectrum towards peace. The trigger for movement in the direction of war can take many forms. No two crises are identical and each needs to be dealt with in a unique manner in terms of the substance of any negotiations and arrangements put in place to restore stability. Some disagreements are so fundamental that they will never be resolved absolutely. In such cases the aim must be to put in

place arrangements that allow for the parties to exist in a stable relationship despite their disagreement. Indeed, it may be easier to achieve stability by institutionalising disagreement and putting in place a framework for reducing its effects rather than wasting valuable effort trying to resolve the irresolvable. Military containment is a positive role for armed forces, the aim of which is to achieve stability in terms of security, which will allow other, political, diplomatic or economic, efforts to move the disputing parties towards a lasting peaceful settlement.

### **The United Kingdom's Involvement**

The spectrum can be used to describe the UK's relationships with other states. It also applies, however, to relationships between other states when the UK is merely an observer or possibly an independent participant in the process of conflict prevention and resolution. Importantly, such situations can be truly international (involving two or more states) or they can be to do with internal conflicts and civil wars that also pose a threat to international stability in general terms. The manner in which the UK copes with its own international relations and becomes involved in crisis resolution and the restoration of stability, is a matter for policy. If a decision is made to employ the Armed Forces for that purpose, it is most likely to result in them operating with those of other states in multinational alliance or coalition arrangements, with relationships of increasing complexity.

In whatever capacity the UK is involved, the three instruments of policy are employed - the diplomatic, the economic and the military - in concert as the circumstances demand. The military instrument is but one of the means at the Government's disposal. There are many ways of categorising the vast range of military operations dealing with crisis management and the maintenance of stability. Different states use different definitions of the various terms, but all are concerned with the following activities.

## **PREVENTING CONFLICT**

Prevention of conflict is a vital element in the maintenance of international stability and security. The primary means of conflict prevention are diplomatic, including in circumstances in which diplomatic efforts are backed up by the implicit threat to engage military force. As a potential crisis begins to take form, yet more concerted efforts involving the full range of diplomatic, economic and military instruments may need to be brought into play. This activity will inevitably involve several departments of government and Cabinet Office involvement will be essential to ensure the UK's strategic decision-making and activities are coherent and properly orchestrated. Defence diplomacy activities (such as military visits, exchanges of military information and doctrine, and the provision of military education and training) are

intended to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces.

## **ENFORCING ORDER**

Enforcement action is the closest to war in the sense that the nature of the task will usually result in a UN mandate to employ warfighting techniques to achieve the aim. Such operations are not driven by the need for impartiality because the mandate will typically be aimed at coercing a particular named state or states to adopt an explicit course of action. The aim is likely to be to coerce the various parties to engage in negotiations towards a peace agreement, to deter them from taking particular actions, or something similarly prescriptive. This was certainly the case in relation to the crisis in the Gulf in 1990/91, and the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Although NATO's intervention in Kosovo was not subject to a specific UN mandate, it was certainly mounted to ensure Serbian compliance with previous UN Security Council resolutions. Both the ejection of Iraq from Kuwait and the use of force to coerce Belgrade to negotiate required warfighting techniques. In that sense, the discussion on the British approach to warfare in Chapter 3 has significant relevance.

## **MANAGING CONFRONTATION**

Even with an agreement in place, armed forces may still be needed to contain residual conflict between protagonists while other political, diplomatic or economic actions are taken to conclude a lasting settlement of the dispute. The over-riding consideration in conducting Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in circumstances requiring military containment, is that the military instrument is but one component of the total effort required to achieve lasting peace. Other elements include the host peoples and their government, civil administrators, international organizations (including the UN and its specialist agencies), non-governmental organizations, and commercial companies supporting operations and looking to assist with reconstruction projects. However, while all such organizations are vital, it is the military forces deployed into the affected area that provide the ultimate power base; it is their ability to escalate and to employ force that ensures a stable security environment within which the others can operate. Force must be used as part of an overarching approach to confrontation management. The use of warfighting techniques may be essential to ensure security or compliance, but the aim will never be destruction or the application of lethal force for its own sake. When force is used it is vital to regard it as a tool to be used in support of broader confrontation management and its application will need to be coordinated with other elements of confrontation management in progress at the same time.

In the early stages, and while stabilising the security situation, armed forces may be the only organised group present. They need to be prepared to initiate comprehensive campaign planning to include each element as it arrives. The Armed Forces may also

have to undertake some emergency aid tasks and reconstruction to help restore basic facilities for a suffering population, as well as assisting with some policing roles to create a secure and stable environment. The purpose of armed forces' activity is to create the conditions that allow other agencies to continue progress towards restoring normality without the need for a military presence. It is therefore counterproductive for the armed forces to create a situation in which the population is dependent on them. Every effort has to be made to encourage civilian agencies to take over the various tasks as soon as possible. In order to achieve their part of the mission, the Armed Forces may have to use varying levels of force. The end state of military withdrawal must always be borne in mind, and there are a number of considerations which are important in achieving it.

### **Impartiality**

Normally, once a peace agreement has been reached, there will be a mandate from an international authority giving the parameters of the operation. At this stage there is strategic level consent for the presence of a military force. It acts impartially in order to maintain and promote that consent. Impartiality is judged in relation to the mandate. Action is taken against parties in respect of their lack of compliance with the mandate, the conditions of which will be imposed without bias.

### **Consent**

While there is strategic level consent (in the form of a UN mandate for example) for armed forces to be present, there may well be variance in the degree of consent at lower levels, and in different locations. Military actions will need to be robust at times, but the need to promote consent is always borne in mind.

### **Restraint in the Use of Force**

An unduly heavy-handed approach with excessive use of force is unlikely to aid in the promotion of consent. While it may be necessary at times to use an increased level of force in order to enforce compliance with the mandate, the minimum necessary force is used, consistent with the objective and the mandate. Warfighting capabilities will be an essential tool in many situations, with the ability to deploy lethal force in a deliberate and focused manner serving as a support to confrontation management. The longer-term view must always be borne in mind when dealing with immediate crises and the use of force must never be regarded as having a destructive result as its aim or objective. An appropriate interpretation of the meanings of coercion and deterrence is required, in which lethal force is used to assist in the management of confrontation rather than the destruction of the enemy's fighting power or will to fight.

## **Force Capability and Credibility**

With varying degrees of consent at different levels, the course and intensity of the operation will be unpredictable. It is critical that the commander has sufficient fighting power at his disposal to deter and coerce as required. The credibility of the military force depends on its ability to apply the appropriate level of force to suit the circumstances. Given past experience, one real possibility is that the same forces may be required to employ warfighting techniques, to conduct PSOs and to provide humanitarian assistance all in the same area at the same time. The ability of all concerned to cope with the necessary shifts in intellectual approach required in such fluid situations will be crucial to success.

## **Long-Term View**

The military aim in PSOs is not to gain a military success over an enemy, but to create, through confrontation management techniques, a stable environment for other agencies to do their work. All actions should therefore be planned and executed with this long-term view in mind.

## **Civil-Military Co-operation**

The various organizations involved in achieving the overall aim of a self sustaining peace will each have a role in reaching this end state. Activity in one area may well depend on the completion of a task in another, and agencies may need assistance from each other. It is critical that there is close co-operation between all those involved, and that each agency recognises the part it is playing in the overall plan.

# **HUMANITARIAN AID**

## **Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations**

There will be occasions when it will be appropriate to deploy military assets to assist in a foreign emergency or disaster relief operation, either on a national basis or as part of an international effort. In such operations, the UK's Armed Forces will be deployed for a specific task in an entirely benign posture (except for essential force protection) and in support of the coordinating humanitarian agency.

## **Humanitarian Assistance**

The provision of humanitarian aid is principally a function of humanitarian and development agencies. There may be circumstances, especially during conflict, when these agencies are unable to deliver such aid without support from the military. Such support, termed *Humanitarian Assistance*, differs from that undertaken in *Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations*, in that the provision of humanitarian aid is

not the primary mission of the military commander, the force has not been deployed in support of a humanitarian agency but for the purpose of military operations, and the military will hand over full responsibility for the humanitarian task to civilian agencies at the earliest possible opportunity.

## THE ESSENTIALS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

During crises there will be a demanding set of shifting priorities and objectives and any organization for crisis management must be designed to meet various essential criteria. These have all been taken into account in developing the UK's Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO), the current arrangements for which are described in detail in *UKOPSDOC*.

**Selection and Maintenance of the Aim**, the 'master' principle of war, is of crucial importance in this context and the source of a fundamental dilemma. The military desire is for a clearly stated and hard objective as the basis for mission planning. Unfortunately, the essential fluidity of crises renders the identification of clear, firm and enduring aims almost impossible from a political point of view. As soon as any military operation commences, the crisis agenda inevitably changes and political aims and objectives develop afresh. This is particularly the case in PSOs and during fast moving crises. In contrast, during longer-term operations established to maintain stability the military aims will tend to be clearer and better understood.

Crisis management at the higher levels needs to **accommodate both political and military imperatives**. The DCMO represents the highest levels of direction and command; essentially the strategic and operational levels. By definition, it is a mix of political and military decision making, its purpose being to transform political desire into military tasking. It necessarily involves both the political leadership of the nation and the highest levels of military command. Military action also provides support for other aspects of grand strategy. There is little point in trying to avoid entirely the dilemma created by the military desire for hard, clear and fixed aims and the political tendency to shift objectives as the situation changes. Both political and military leaders need to be aware of this fundamental difference between their ways of thinking and make efforts at their level to arrive at a workable solution that results in clear direction being given to subordinate commands. Military forces are flexible, but the maintenance of the aim is fundamental to military success.

Adequate **warning of impending crises** is crucial. By adequate is meant sufficient information to provide political and military strategic decision makers with the necessary background to consider appropriate options. These options include both the possibility of early positive engagement leading to rapid effect, and that of avoiding inappropriate embroilment in a crisis. Links into the intelligence community and the ability to monitor situations around the world are paramount. The aim is to avoid

being caught unawares, although, by their nature, crises are unpredictable. Contingency planning for the more likely types of circumstances to be confronted is vital, although such plans are flexible in order to allow for modification when the actual circumstances reveal themselves.

The **management of information** presents a wide range of difficulties. The essential problem is that of quantity and the selective dissemination of that which is relevant to conduct effective operations and to manage crises. The DCMO has to cope with large amounts of information by selecting that which is important and ignoring that which is not. Analysis of information and ordering it in a manner that provides useful indicators for operational planning is an important feed into the Strategic Estimate to be completed for any crisis likely to lead to involvement by the UK Armed Forces.

The DCMO's internal procedures and ways of working are optimised for dealing with a fluid and rapidly developing situation and **coping with uncertainty and surprise**. While there is a set of procedures in place that represent the ideal process (a form of default setting), these will almost certainly have to be curtailed or shortened in order for the organization to take the initiative and to remain within an adversary's decision cycle – a key element of the manoeuvrist approach. A 'battle rhythm' will emerge that will almost certainly be determined not by pure military imperatives but by the need to reflect political imperatives, including the need to cope with the demands of the press and broadcast media and sustain public support. The dynamics of the crisis will typically fluctuate, with **frequent increases and decreases in tempo**.

The assessment of the strategic environment for the benefit of current crisis management and contingency planning, includes consideration of the range of most likely contingencies, with a generic set of crisis circumstances as a guiding framework. Sight is not lost of **possible worst cases** occurring. While the DCMO is optimised for dealing with typical crises, key members of it must always consider how they would react to the most challenging of circumstances. The organization is designed with sufficient flexibility to cope with significant departures from the norm of international crisis, with scope for necessary augmentation should this prove necessary.

Importantly, the use of the military instrument involves the UK's Armed Forces in a complex series of relationships with those who are also engaged. The relationship between the DCMO and other government departments (the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development, for example,) is fundamental to a national strategy in which the military perform a function that must be fully integrated with the activities of others. In a sense this is a relatively straightforward requirement, but even so it generates difficulties. The DCMO seeks to incorporate representatives of all relevant government agencies and it

is especially important that the Information Campaign is co-ordinated across all government departments and with allies.

Relationships will also exist with a plethora of other organizations that will result in an increase in the complexity of the overall challenge of administration and co-ordination. The **integration of military operations**, not only with those of other nations but also with large numbers of international organizations and NGOs, is one of the most difficult challenges to meet. It must be remembered that these organizations are under no obligation to co-ordinate their activities with those of the military. They have a different set of objectives and a different set of values leading to markedly differing approaches in some cases. NGOs may have strategic influence unconstrained by formal chains of command. The DCMO has to take full account of this and be aware of the ways in which this issue influences the way that military commanders and their forces operate in the Joint Operations Area.

With the Armed Forces typically deploying elements of their total fighting power on several operations at a time the **challenges of concurrency** are potentially severe. There are two related issues that arise from this. First, there is a limit to what the Armed Forces can achieve with the necessarily limited resources at their disposal. Their professionalism, competence and overall fighting power make the UK's Armed Forces attractive candidates for multinational forces, especially through NATO and in support of the UN. HM Government comes under regular international pressure to contribute. The UK is particularly cautious about military over-stretch and the temptation to respond to several crises by deploying forces that are inadequate for the task. Second, the organization itself has to be flexible enough to cope with the demands of more than one crisis at a time, while also maintaining an ability to cope with further urgent crises as they develop.

## **MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM**

While the UK's Armed Forces exist for the defence of the nation and of other national interests, they can also be used domestically. They consist of well trained and disciplined men and women, many of whom have developed skills that are not exclusively military in their application. Physically fit and trained to apply lethal force if necessary, in extreme circumstances they may be useful in tackling armed and dangerous criminals, especially terrorists. They possess equipment that may well be suitable for a wide range of uses beyond those directly related to warfighting. Adaptable, resourceful and often highly trained in civilian recognised trades, servicemen and women can be deployed to maintain essential services. As well motivated teams, military units are an obvious choice to assist the civilian population in times of disaster or emergency. The Armed Forces are, therefore, potentially useful

instruments of domestic policy in reserve, capable of dealing with a range of contingencies as required by HM Government.

Importantly, despite their obvious utility, the use of the Armed Forces for domestic purposes is potentially controversial and strict limitations are placed on their domestic employment. The relationship between the Armed Forces and civil authorities in the UK is the subject of aspects of constitutional and administrative law and there has developed, over three hundred years, a legal doctrine governing the domestic use of military personnel. At the core of that doctrine is the absolute primacy of civil authorities; when Armed Forces' personnel are used on domestic tasks they are only employed in support of relevant and legally responsible civil authorities. A second principle of profound importance is that Armed Forces' personnel at all times remain subject to the domestic law of the realm, regardless of the task on which they are engaged. Those involved in providing assistance to civil authorities must be fully briefed as to their legal rights and obligations and the relationship they will have with the responsible civil authorities for which they are providing support. There are three categories of Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) provided within the UK:

### **Military Aid to the Civil Power**

Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) is assistance provided for the purpose of law enforcement and internal security. Activities conducted under this heading may, in extreme circumstances, require Armed Forces' personnel to use force, including lethal force, if necessary. Examples of MACP include counter terrorism operations (including the long running deployment of military forces in Northern Ireland), drug interdiction and fishery protection. In most instances ashore, a principle invariably applied is that MACP operations are mounted only in exceptional circumstances, with military forces withdrawing as soon as the civil power is able to cope. MACP operations are therefore associated with law enforcement emergencies, with even the long-standing military involvement in Northern Ireland still being seen as an emergency involvement. At sea, however, the Royal Navy has long been involved in routine law enforcement operations, fishery protection being the longest running continuous MACP operation in British military history. Although force is rarely necessary in this routine MACP operation, it is vital that the ability to use it is retained for extreme circumstances. When force is used in MACP operations, it is strictly in accordance with legal limitations and each individual serviceman and woman is personally obliged to comply with the law.

### **Military Assistance to Government Departments**

Military Assistance to Government Departments (MAGD) is the use of military personnel to provide essential services, including those that are being disrupted by

industrial, or strike, action. Until recently, this element of MACA was known as Military Assistance to Civil Ministries and was concerned solely with the provision of essential services during industrial disputes. The recent change of title updates the terminology but also draws into the category provision of essential services in circumstances not exclusively related to industrial disputes. The main principles that are invariably applied during MAGD operations are:

- the Armed Forces are not to be used for ‘strike-breaking’ and
- they are never, under any circumstances, to be armed.

### **Military Assistance to the Civil Community**

Military Assistance to the Civil Community (MACC) is any form of benign assistance provided to the community at large, either directly or at the request of the appropriate civil authorities, including other Government departments. It includes disaster relief and search and rescue operations. Routine assistance must not be provided in a manner that disadvantages those civilian contractors that might otherwise have benefited from the work undertaken by Armed Forces’ personnel.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN – THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND**

As already explained in Chapter 3, Mission Command is at the core of the UK's philosophy of command and is a central theme that permeates down through British doctrine, from the strategic to the tactical level. What Mission Command addresses, more than anything else, is the essential balance between direction and delegation. If achieved, the result is effective military operations. Getting it right is a fundamental skill, at the heart of which is a true dilemma.

### **THE COMMAND DILEMMA**

There are two means through which effective command is exercised: the promulgation of sound doctrine and the maintenance of effective communications. Modern communications present commanders with two interconnected challenges. The first is the risk of superior levels of command 'micro-managing' operations at lower levels. The second is too heavy a reliance on communications, which has the effect of undermining the longer-term ability of subordinates to take the initiative. Subordinate initiative is fundamental to the manoeuvrist approach. So too is the need for a range of disparate activities to be co-ordinated to achieve effective systemic disruption of the enemy. The only response to these two opposing but closely related challenges is to strike a responsible degree of balance in command and control. This allows the initiative to be taken by subordinates but with a responsible superior hand able to convey guidance when appropriate – and provide support when a subordinate makes a mistake, as will surely occur. Given the immediate impact that tactical decisions can have on strategic outcomes, achieving the right balance is not always easy. Nevertheless, it is a fundamentally important skill for commanders to develop. The key to this is mutual trust and confidence amongst officers at all levels, so that subordinate commanders are empowered to use their initiative when they are unable to get guidance from their superior.

### **THE COMMANDER'S PLAN**

Commanders at all levels will always develop a plan that will convey to subordinates what the objective is, how it is to be achieved, and by what means. The plan is the commander's own way of achieving the tasks delegated to him by his superior and contains details of how these will be achieved given the forces allocated. The plan also provides subordinates with a clear indication of their own roles and the forces they are allocated to achieve them, allowing them in turn to produce their own plan and to determine for themselves how best to achieve the allotted objectives. At the strategic level the plan is in the form of the Chief of Defence Staff's Directive to the Joint Commander. It is informed by a strategic level estimate.

## **ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS**

Commanders invariably consider three issues that determine the shape and nature of their campaign plan: What is the objective? What means have I at my disposal? How is it to be achieved? These are formally addressed in the estimate process through which the plan is developed.

### **Ends**

The identification of a clear and unambiguous objective is the core issue in planning terms. The selection and maintenance of the aim is the 'master' principle of war. Unfortunately, a fixed and enduring objective is not always possible, especially at the strategic level at which political considerations are usually at their most influential. Political objectives are rarely hard and fast in a conflict that does not threaten national survival; they are much more likely to be soft and ill-defined. This is when flexibility becomes the key to success in campaign planning. If the political objective changes, as it almost always will, that new objective creates a requirement for a change in the plan. The plan is not merely a way of stating an objective; it is also the principal means of promulgating a change to it.

### **Ways**

Knowing the objective and the forces available, the commander develops the plan to make best use of the seven fundamental defence capabilities that deliver fighting power. In doing so, the principal question is: how do I make it happen? All commanders need to understand how they can use their capabilities as a lever to achieve the objective, what assumptions they must make and how reliable they are. They assess the likelihood of changes being required and constantly consider what they might be in order to remain prepared for that eventuality.

### **Means**

The means at a commander's disposal will be those forces or capabilities allocated, Additional forces will be requested by a commander if he feels they are. Commanders consider the nature of their force, what objectives are within its grasp, and the nature of the risks inherent in pursuing that objective with the given force.

## **THE ATTRIBUTES OF COMMAND**

Commanders stamp their leadership style on the forces under their command, regardless of the level at which they are commanding. At each level in the chain of command, strong leadership contributes to the success and smooth functioning of the Armed Forces. An outstanding characteristic of all great commanders is their refusal to be dominated by circumstances. While not challenging the inevitable, they use

events around them to achieve their own ends, rather than modify their ends to keep pace with the tide of events. Personal qualities present in a successful commander are many and varied. Commanders require an open mind receptive to all possibilities and the ability to grasp the essentials. Their decisions are firm and timely, arrived at by thinking in quiet periods what action should be taken if different circumstances arise.

Commanders must remain calm in crisis, with the courage to withstand mental stress and strain, and the refusal to be distracted by bad tidings. Courage has both physical and moral dimensions. Commanders require both but, at the more senior levels, it is often their moral courage that brings forth success through their willingness to make unpopular decisions, to stick to a clear plan and to act decisively. Even at the tactical level, where physical danger is more likely, commanders may have to display moral courage by exercising effective command from a secure position, rather than submitting to an instinctive desire to show physical courage by leading from the front.

Commanders need to explain clearly what they want to achieve and why, so that they can be effectively and appropriately supported by their peers and subordinates. They are bold, because good leaders must be successful to retain the confidence of their subordinates, and success will not come from faintheartedness. They are ready to accept and discharge responsibility at all times because the mere acceptance of responsibility without the determination to fulfil it by executive action is useless. They generate mutual trust, respect and confidence between themselves and subordinates, peers and superiors. They are able to convince subordinates at all levels that they have their best interests at heart. This is done by a mixture of wide and sympathetic understanding of human nature, an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of individuals, and meticulous and impartial care in dealing with their affairs. They have the confidence to delegate in the knowledge that their intentions have been clearly expressed and well promulgated. And last but not least, it is highly desirable that they have a sense of humour; the importance of this in maintaining morale and motivation should never be downplayed.

Many of those who have no personal experience of the UK's modern, volunteer Armed Forces tend to assume that their efficiency and ability to achieve success is due to a rigid, disciplinarian's approach to getting things done. Nothing could be further from the truth. Ultimately, in the tightest and most demanding operational circumstances, orders need to be given and carried out with a sense of urgency and without question. However, those circumstances are few and far between and the essence of sound military organization is achieved by instilling in people a discipline based on co-operation and teamwork. This involves a willingness to challenge superiors when appropriate and to accept such challenge from subordinates. Commanders maintain an open mind and apply free thought responsibly. Importantly, they accept also the need to act with others in a co-ordinated fashion by subordinating their own personal views and desires to the higher needs of the Armed Forces.

Commanders know how hard to drive their force. People must not be spurred beyond the limits at which they lose their powers of recovery. Undue mental strain often leads to physical exhaustion - and undue physical exhaustion to mental eccentricities. Combat stress is inherent in warfare but it can be tempered by physical and moral courage and by confidence in a sound and well-expressed plan. A commander must have a firm knowledge of the dangers and warning signs of unrelieved combat stress. Effective leadership, self-control and confidence in the team all combine to help limit the natural fear of violence.

Commanders must also consider their own well-being, for it is essential that their energy, mental and physical, should be conserved for crucial periods. They must ensure they have adequate and regular periods of rest and reflection, avoid over immersion in matters of detail that are the job of their staff, and delegate as much as possible to subordinates. They issue clear and concise orders and leave their staff to work out the details. This creates a more responsive force, gives subordinates experience essential for their own development, and preserves the vital force of the commander for when it is most required.